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I.  Introduction 
 
  Consideration of race in admissions and provision of financial aid has become common practice 
among selective institutions of higher education, excepting instances where it has been banned.
1  While 
college and university decision makers have shown a willingness to promote racial diversity with 
affirmative action policies, these practices are under legal and legislative attack.  The University of 
California’s Board of Regents eliminated race- (and sex-) based affirmative action policies in 1995, this 
ban expanded to all public institutions in California by referendum in 1996.  The state of Washington 
followed suit by passing an identical referendum in 1998.  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against 
race-related admissions in Hopwood vs. Texas (1996), eliminating such practices in universities receiving 
public funding in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.  The use of race in admissions at the University of 
Georgia was proscribed by federal court in Johnson vs. University of Georgia (2001).  At Governor Jeb 
Bush’s urging, the Florida legislature eliminated affirmative action at Florida public universities in 2000.  
As we write this paper, the U.S. Supreme Court is on the verge of ruling on affirmative action in higher 
education, having already heard arguments about the University of Michigan’s affirmative action policy.
2 
    This paper develops an equilibrium model of the practice of affirmative action by colleges and 
analyzes the consequences of its proscription.
3  In the model, colleges maximize a quality index that 
increases with academic qualification of the student body, inputs provided per student, and simple 
measures of racial and income diversity.  Colleges are differentiated ex ante by access to nontuition 
revenues, which we refer to as endowment earnings.  Potential students differ by race, income, and 
academic qualification, and they maximize a utility function that increases in the quality of their education.  
We find a variant of a monopolistically competitive equilibrium, first allowing affirmative action practices.  
Equilibrium has a quality hierarchy of colleges, with an associated partition of the type space of potential 
                                                 
1 Evidence on the practice of affirmative action in higher education is discussed below. 
2 Federal precedent at the time we write this is from the Supreme Court’s Bakke decision in 1978, a 
challenge to affirmative action in higher education under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The 
majority opinion by Justice Lewis Powell condemned quotas but ruled that admission officers could “take 
race into account” in admissions.  This is discussed further below. 
3 By “colleges” we mean providers of four-year college degrees, including the undergraduate divisions of 
universities. 
  2students into colleges and a no-college alternative.  For realistic parameterizations, colleges provide merit 
and need-based aid in equilibrium, and pursue affirmative action in admissions and provision of financial 
aid.  We specify and calibrate a counterpart computational model and compute an equilibrium. 
  We then examine the consequences of proscription of affirmative action.  We presume that 
preferences of college administrators and potential students are unchanged, but that college policies must 
be race blind.  In equilibrium, colleges weigh the informational content of income and academic 
qualification about race in formulating race-blind admission and tuition policies.  Students with nonracial 
characteristics that are more likely to be associated with minorities are given some preference in admissions 
and provision of financial aid.  In the calibrated model, colleges give some preference to students with high 
or moderately high incomes who also have relatively low scores on standardized college entrance exam, 
these students relatively more likely to be minorities.  In spite of colleges’ strategies to maintain diversity, 
we find computationally that minorities are significantly hurt by proscription of affirmative action.  For 
example, minority presence in the top tier of colleges declines by more than two-thirds.  Non-minorities 
gain from elimination of affirmative action, but by very little with some exceptions.   
  Three strands of literature relate to this paper.  The most closely related paper is by Chan and 
Eyster (forthcoming).  They also analyze theoretically the proscription of affirmative action assuming, like 
us, that college administrators have preference for diversity and will employ alternative signals of race 
under the ban.
4  They emphasize that such a ban may reduce the academic qualification of the admitted 
student body, when one motivation for such a ban is to improve academic credentials.
5  Our analysis 
complements theirs, while differing in several important ways.  Their model has one college, no 
consideration of tuition, and no variation in incomes of potential students.  With one college, their model 
abstracts from competition among colleges and there is no college quality hierarchy.  Effects on access 
                                                 
4 See also Chan and Eyster (2002) which models the formation of preferences for affirmative action in 
college admissions, individuals taking into account the anticipated effects on their own admission 
prospects.  
5 Loury, Fryer, and Yuret (2003) also investigate the consequences of a ban on affirmative action in a 
model where colleges maximize aggregate academic qualification of the student body subject to a racial 
quota and assuming the races have different costs of increasing their precollege academic qualifications.  
They also show that the ban will lower academic qualification of the student body given race-blind 
admissions that satisfy the racial quota.  They go on to analyze the effects of the ban on costs expended to 
increase academic qualification.  Our model of diversity preference does not employ a racial quota as 
discussed below.  Otherwise, our analysis differs in very similar ways as from that of Chan and Eyster as 
discussed next in the text. 
  3along the college quality hierarchy are a key element of our analysis.  As well, we examine effects on 
tuition policies, and how this affects the races.  Our inclusion of variation of income of potential students 
adds a realistic dimension to the analysis that is important to the nature of equilibria with and without 
affirmative action, and plays a key role in inference about race under the ban. 
Second are our papers on higher education (Epple, Romano, and Sieg, 2002a & 2002b) and earlier 
papers with models of education that emphasize peer externalities (Rothschild and White, 1995, Epple and 
Romano, 1998 & 2002).  Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2002b) develop and test a variant of the model of 
higher education employed here, but ignoring race issues.  Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2002a) is a 
preliminary analysis of introducing race preferences into the model, but with no analysis of proscription of 
affirmative action.  
 The third set of related papers are concerned with proscription of affirmative action either with no 
strategic response of colleges or as compared to some prescribed alternative.  Kane (1998) estimates race-
based preferences in college admissions and then shows that class-based affirmative action is a poor 
substitute.  Kane (2000) provides evidence that high-school graduates ranking in the top 10 percent of their 
class and with lower than 80 percentile SAT scores are disproportionately minorities, suggesting an 
admissions strategy to enhance diversity at selective colleges.  Long (2002a) also estimates preferences 
given to minorities in college admissions and then uses these estimates to forecast the effects of a ban on 
affirmative action with no substitute policy and also if a policy of admitting top-10 percent graduates from 
high schools is substituted.
6  In Chapter 2 of their comprehensive analysis of affirmative action in a set of 
selective U.S. colleges, Bowen and Bok (1998) forecast effects on African Americans of banning 
affirmative action assuming probabilities of admission for a nonracial profile are as for whites.  Cancian 
(1999) examines the substitutability of class-based for race-based admissions.  The present paper is 
differentiated from this line of research in our modeling of equilibrium provision of higher education with a 
set of competing colleges and our allowing colleges to respond strategically to a ban.   
      We close this Introduction with a brief discussion of evidence on affirmative action practices in 
higher education.  These studies focus on admissions or financial aid.  Bowen and Bok (1998) detail the 
practice of affirmative action in admissions of African Americans in five highly selective colleges.  One 
                                                 
6 See also Long’s (2002b) forecasts of effects on applications of minorities to colleges from a ban on 
affirmative action. 
  4finding they report is that the probability of admission in 1989 for white candidates with SAT score in the 
range 1200-1249 was 19 percent, while 60 percent for African American candidates.  Kane (1998) uses 
data from the High School and Beyond survey and estimates admission probability in 1984 with Black and 
Hispanic as (separate) explanatory variables.  He finds significant affirmative action in the top two quintiles 
of four-year colleges (ranked by mean SAT), most strongly in the top quintile.  Using data from the 
National Education Logitudinal Study on 1992 high-school graduates, Kane (2000) reconfirms affirmative 
action in admissions in top quintile colleges.   Long (2002a) estimates admission probabilities to four-year 
colleges using data from the National Education Longitudinal Survey.  He finds significant affirmative 
action in admission for minorities in the early 90’s at both upper and lower tier colleges, but with stronger 
preference at upper tier colleges.  In the basic regression, for example, he estimates that being African 
American increases the “likelihood of acceptance by the equivalent of a 254 point increase in SAT or a 
two-thirds of a point increase in GPA (p. 11).” 
Manski and Wise (1983) found evidence of significant tuition discounting to nonwhite students.  
This has been reaffirmed in subsequent research by Kane and Spizman (1994) and Epple, Romano, and 
Sieg (forthcoming).  Using Tobit estimates of financial aid in 1995-96, we estimate an increase in financial 
aid on the order of $1,500 for African American and Hispanic students in public schools, with higher 
(lower) aid in private colleges for African Americans (Hispanics).
7 
Section II of the paper presents the theoretical model.  Section III develops results assuming 
affirmative action is allowed.  Section IV shows how theoretical predictions change under a ban on 
affirmative action.  Section V describes the computational model.  Computational results are presented in 
Section VI.  Further interpretation and discussion is contained in Section VI.  Section VII concludes.     
 
II. Theoretical Model 
 
  Here we present the theoretical model.  The economy consists of colleges and potential students.   
A. Students.  A potential student is characterized by three variables: race (r), household income (y), and 
score (s) on standardized college admissions test.  We will frequently refer to potential students as just 
students, when it is clear by context whether they attend a college or not.  We specify “race” to be 
                                                 
7 The coefficient estimates on the minority dummies are highly significant, but those on the interaction with 
private colleges are not significant.    
  5dichotomous, white (w) or nonwhite (nw).  Let  denote the proportion of students of race r 
in the economy. 
r Γ , r{ w , n w } , ∈
  Household income is continuous with range [0,ymax].  While having in mind a household decision 
about college, we refer to y as student income or just income henceforth.   Score is continuous with range 
[smin,smax].  The joint density function of race r’s score and income is given by f
r(s,y), assumed positive on S 
/ (smin,smax) x (0,ymax).  Normalize the economy’s student population to one, and let 
 denote the population density of (s,y).  In our computational model 
below, we will use SAT to measure score.
w w nw nw f(s,y) Γ f( s , y )Γ f( s , y =+ )
                                                
8  “Score” can, however, be given a more general interpretation 
as a one-dimensional measure of academic qualification that combines performance on standardized exam, 
pre-college grades, and any other quantifiable measures of academic capability.
9     
Student utility is an increasing and twice differentiable function of a numeraire x, college quality 
q, and score: U = U(x,q,s).  The numeraire is given by x = y – p, where p denotes tuition if a college is 
attended.  Determination of college quality is discussed below.  If no college is attended, q = q0, the 
educational quality of high school.
10  A special case of the model assumes utility is increasing in 
educational achievement a, which is an increasing function of educational quality (q) and score: U = 
U(x,a(q,s)).   The latter interpretation is used for some of the normative analysis in Section VI.  Most of our 
analysis is positive, however.  Implications regarding variables such as financial aid policies, admission 
policies, the college quality hierarchy and the allocation of students across the college quality hierarchy are 
the same regardless  of the reasons why quality appears in the utility function.  For predicting those 
variables, quality may be preferred simply because households and their students gain utility from attending 
a higher-ranked school, or quality may be valued because it affects achievement.  While most predictions 
from the analysis that follows do not depend on which of the interpretations is adopted, implications 
regarding achievement clearly depend on which of these reasons underlies the preference for quality, and 
 
8 While not all potential students take a college admissions test in reality, we assume those that would be 
admitted and attend a college do so, hence that students can anticipate their score.  In our analysis it is then 
equivalent to assume every potential student actually takes the test. 
 
9 Kane (2000) finds that SAT and high-school rank are both significant in predicting admission and college 
GPA at top quintile colleges.   
10 Hence, we assume the quality of the “outside option” is the same for everyone.  This assumption might 
be relaxed, perhaps by making q0 a function of income and/or race. 
  6some normative implications differ as well.  As we proceed, we will identify implications that depend on an 
achievement interpretation.   Note that we are assuming preferences are independent of race.  We 
considered some alternatives to this in Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2002a).  Here differences across the races 
derive solely from differences in their distributions over (s,y). 
  We assume a positive income elasticity of demand for educational quality: 






∂  ∂∂  >
∂
                                                        (1) 
We also assume a non-negative “ability” elasticity of this demand: 






∂  ∂∂  ≥
∂
                                                        (2)   
Taking as given college’s tuition and admission policies, students choose among their educational options 
to maximize utility. 
B. Colleges.  By “colleges” we mean institutions of higher education that grant four-year degrees, hence, 
including the undergraduate divisions of universities.  There are n colleges, differentiated ex ante by their 
“endowment earnings,” Wi, i = 1,2,…,n.  All nontuition earnings of a college make up Wi (i ranges from 1 
to n unless indicated otherwise).  We assume Wi ≠ Wj for all colleges i and j, and number the colleges so 
that W1 < W2 < … < Wn. 
  Each college chooses tuition and admission policies and educational inputs to maximize a quality 
index.
11  College quality is assumed to be an increasing, twice differentiable, and quasi-concave function of 
mean student score ( ), educational inputs per student (I), a measure of student income diversity (D θ
y), and 
a measure of racial diversity (D
R): qq  There is no doubt that colleges care about at least 
three of the four variables in our quality functions.  Colleges clearly pursue students with higher scores; 
other things constant, they would like higher instructional expenditures per student (e.g., lower 
faculty/student ratios), and they would like a racially diverse student body.  What is the evidence for the 
fourth (income-diversity) component?  Empirical analysis (e.g., Epple, Romano, Sieg, forthcoming) 
y R
ii i i i ( θ ,I ,D ,D ). =
                                                 
11 Tuition to a student can itself, of course, induce or prohibit attendance, so our specification of a separate 
admission policy is for clarity and analytical convenience. 
  7confirms the commonplace observation that colleges vary financial aid with income (i.e., provide need-
based aid).  One might hypothesize that this is simply price discrimination arising through exercise of 
market power by colleges.  In our model, price discrimination by income does indeed emerge from the 
exercise of market power, but colleges do not have sufficient market power to pursue such price 
discrimination to the extent required to yield the income-based pricing that we observe in the data (Epple, 
Romano, Sieg, 2002b). Thus, we introduce a concern for income diversity into the quality function as a 
means of accounting for the observed degree of pricing by income.  Note that colleges’ use of the term 
"need-based aid" is consistent with a concern for income diversity, though such a spin might be used as a 
convenient rationalization regardless of the motive for income-based pricing.  
  The simple measure of income diversity we adopt is 
y
yi i Dµ µ = ,
y
where µ  is the mean income in 
the population,   is the mean income of students in college i, and we are assuming   as is 
empirically relevant.
y
i µ i µµ >
12  Similarly, our racial diversity measure is 
u u
i i r r R
i i D ΓΓ , =
u
i r
where   is the under-
represented race in college i (meaning  ), and Γ denotes the proportion of the under-
represented race in college i.   As consistent with the evidence with exception discussed below, assume that 









ii ΓΓ = n w D . 
  The peer student-score measure ( ) in the quality index embodies an ability-related peer effect on 
educational quality that could operate through several channels.  This could be due to students learning 
from one another in and outside of the classroom, enhanced competition among students for grades, 
student-body effects on hiring and motivation of teachers, and/or a variant of Spencian signaling.
i θ
13    
                                                 
12 If µµ then  iy , < y qD 0 , ∂∂ ≤  though this will not be relevant to any results. 
13 There is a large, growing, and controversial literature on peer effects by social scientists.  Here we 
mention just some of the empirical studies by economists that are most closely related to our model.  Most 
of the literature on peer effects on educational success concern primary and secondary education.  Early 
studies are Coleman (1966), Henderson, Mieszkowski and Sauvageau (1978), and Summers and Wolfe 
(1977).  Manski (1993) details the several difficulties in empirically identifying peer effects.  Evans, Oates, 
and Schwab (1992) find no peer effects in schools on teenage pregnancy or dropping-out once selection is 
taken into account.  Robertson and Symons (1996), Zimmer and Toma (1997), Hoxby (2000), and Ding 
and Lehrer (2001) are more recent studies that find evidence of peer effects on educational success.  
  8  When maximizing quality, colleges observe student type (r,s,y) and take as given the maximum 
alternative utility the student can obtain.
14  We now develop college i’s problem assuming affirmative 
action is allowed, and develop modifications when it is proscribed in Section IV.  Let α  
denote the admission policy of college i,   indicating the proportion of type (r,s,y) in the population 
that the college admits.  Utility taking implies college i believes it can attract any proportion of students to 
whom it provides their alternative utility, a belief that must be fulfilled in equilibrium.  Letting 
i(r,s,y) [0,1] ∈
i α () ⋅
i p (r,s,y) denote college i’s optimal price to student (r,s,y), the maximum alternative utility to college i is 
given by: 
          (3)  
j 1,2,...,n;j i;α ( ) 0isanoptimalchoice j
a







Alternative utility is the maximum of the no-college option and utility attainable at a college willing to 
admit the student.  Let  v
i p (q ();r,s,y) ⋅  denote the reservation price for attending college i, defined by: 
   . (4)  va
ii U(y p ,q (),s) U (r,s,y) −⋅ ≡
Given college i’s belief that a student is willing to attend if offered his alternative utility, charging admitted 
students their reservation price will always be optimal (as this will loosen college i’s budget constraint).  
Note that this also implies   for all colleges i and j.  aa
ij U( ) U( ) ⋅= ⋅
  Costs of college i are given by: 
    (5)  ii i i i C(k ,I ) F V(k ) k I ; V ,V 0, ′′ ′ =+ + >
letting ki denote the number of students attending.  We assume “custodial costs” F + V that are independent 
of quality-enhancing educational inputs, implying an efficient scale 
i
*
ki i kA r g m i n C ( k , I ) k ≡ i
                                                                                                                                                
 that is 
independent of Ii.   
  We can write college i’s optimization problem: 
 
Turning to research on peer effects in higher education, Sacerdote (2001), Zimmerman (1999), and 
Winston and Zimmerman (forthcoming) find peer effects between roommates on grade point averages.  
Betts and Morrell (1999) find that high-school peer groups affect college grade point average.  Arcidiacono 
and Nicholson (2000) find no peer effects among medical students.  As noted above, Epple, Romano, and 
Sieg (2002b) estimate a variant of the present model and find support for its specification, including peer 
student scores in college quality.   
14 Utility taking is as in some of the competitive club-goods literature.  See Scotchmer (1994). 
  9  
nw θ ,I ,µ ,k ,Γ ,α (r,s,y) i iii i i
nw nw
ii y ii Max q(θ ,I ,µ µ ,ΓΓ ) (6.0) 
 s.t.   (6.1)  i α (r,s,y) [0,1] (r,s,y); ∈∀
  (6.2) 
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k[ α (nw,s,y)Γ f( s , y ) α (w,s,y)Γ f (s,y)]dsdy; =+ ∫∫




θ s[α (nw,s,y)Γ f( s , y ) α (w,s,y)Γ f (s,y)]dsdy;
k
=+ ∫∫  (6.4) 




µy [ α (nw,s,y)Γ f( s , y ) α (w,s,y)Γ f (s,y)]dsdy;
k
=+ ∫∫  (6.5) 
and 




Γα (nw,s,y)Γ f( s , y ) d s d y
k
= ∫∫ .  (6.6) 
Constraint (6.2) is the college’s budget constraint, which embodies the optimality of charging admitted 
students (having α ) their reservation price. i 0 >
15   The budget constraint will hold with equality at the 
optimum since the objective function is increasing in educational inputs per student.  Constraint (6.3) 
defines the number of students.  Constraints (6.4) – (6.6) define, respectively, the mean score, mean 
income, and proportion of nonwhite students.  In Section III, we present the solution to Problem (6). 
C. Equilibrium.  Equilibrium satisfies utility maximization by students, quality maximization by the n 
colleges, and a market-clearance condition.  Each potential student makes a utility-maximizing choice 
among colleges willing to admit the student (i.e., those for whom α is an optimal choice) and the 
no-college option, taking as given qualities and the admission and tuition policies of colleges.  Each college 
solves Problem (6), taking as given its endowment and the alternative utility of potential students (or, 
equivalently, the reservation price function).  Market clearance requires that   for all (r,s,y) 
i(r,s,y) 0 >
n
i1 = ∑ i α (r,s,y) 1 ≤
                                                 
15 The specification of tuition to nonadmitted students is irrelevant. 
  10for an optimal α  for each college. i() ⋅
16  If  , then there would be excess demand by colleges 
for students, and colleges would fail to optimize.  If  , then 1 of these students 
can do no better than “choose” no college.  The problem that colleges solve when affirmative action is 
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III. Theoretical Results Allowing Affirmative Action 
A. The College Optimum.  College i’s optimum satisfies  v p p (q  budget balance (i.e., 
(6.2) with equality), the definitional conditions (6.3) – (6.6), and the following first-order conditions: 
    (7.1)  α (r,s,y) [0 C (r,
   i
q
EMC (nw,s,y) V ) ′ ≡+ +  (7.2)   
   i EMC (w,s,y) V y) ′ ≡+ −  (7.3) 
   i
i
λ  (7.4) 
where (7.1) – (7.3) hold for all student types,   is the multiplier on the budget constraint (6.1), and R 
denotes tuition revenues (i.e., the integral term in (6.2)). 
i λ
17  Condition (7.1) describes the admission policy, 
using what we call a student’s effective marginal cost of admission (EMC).  EMC for nonwhites and whites 
are defined respectively in (7.2) and (7.3), these differing only by the last term.  The first two terms in 
EMC equal the marginal resource cost of educating any student.  The third term is the peer “ability” effect, 
equal to the change in mean score from attendance by a type s student, multiplied by the resource cost of 
maintaining quality.  Note that this “cost” is negative for students with score exceeding the college’s mean 
 
16 As shown below, any   is optimal for some (r,s,y) for each college i in equilibrium.  These 
student types are assumed to have access to college i when solving utility maximization, while market 
clearance is fulfilled using the actual number of students that exercise that option.   
i α () [0 ,1 ] ⋅∈
17 Local second-order conditions are satisfied in equilibrium provided V” is sufficiently high. 
  11score.  The fourth term quantifies the analogous effect on the income-diversity measure.  Note that since 
 this cost is positive (negative) for students with income above (below) the college’s mean income.  
The last term is the cost of the effect on racial-diversity, which can again be analogously decomposed, but 
differs across the races.  The cost of admitting a student from the under-represented race (nonwhite) is 
negative since   while positive for the over-represented race.
i µ q0 < ,
nw
i Γ 1, <
18 
RI ∂ ∂
  The economic implication of (7.4) is that college i spends more on educational inputs than the 
Samuelsonian level, as the latter would equate the collective marginal willingness to pay in the college 
(equal here to   since students pay their reservation prices) to the marginal cost (k  Colleges value 
educational inputs both for their revenue generating effect and for the direct effect on quality.  In 
equilibrium, colleges will be differentiated and have some market power, allowing them to depart from 
student optimality (i.e., 
i).
i λ ). <∞
19 It is of interest to note that profit-maximizing colleges would adopt the 
same admission criteria, but would choose Samuelsonian levels of inputs.
20   
B. Properties of Equilibrium with Affirmative Action.  Perhaps the most basic property of equilibrium is 
that a strict educational quality hierarchy characterizes equilibrium. 
Proposition 1.    nn 1 10 qq . . . qq − >> > > .
Proof of Proposition 1. All colleges solve the same problem (6) but with different endowments, implying 
the strict hierarchy that follows the endowment hierarchy among colleges.  Using our assumption that Wn  
< F, some students pay positive tuition at every college, implying q0 < q1.    ,
While the college quality hierarchy follows the endowment hierarchy, a strict hierarchy would need to 
characterize equilibrium if colleges had the same endowments.  The hierarchy with the same endowments 
is driven by preferences of  higher-income types for higher-educational quality and can be proved 
following an argument like that developed in Epple and Romano (1998,2002).
21    
  To establish some of the results that follow, it is convenient to let EMC0(r,s,y) 0 denote the 
hypothetical effective marginal cost of the no-college option.  We appeal to the panels of Figure 1 from our 
≡
                                                 
18 In our model, affirmative action is quite different from a racial quota as discussed in Section VII.  
19 Students would prefer that colleges provide Samuelsonian levels of inputs and lower tuition. 
20 This is shown by solving a college’s profit-maximization problem.  Epple and Romano (1998,2002) 
develop equilibria in a related environment with profit maximizers. 
21 If colleges have the same endowments, then equilibrium will not exist in the present model.   
  12computational analysis to illustrate some of the results.  The solid lines in Figure 1 show the partition by 
race of the (s,y) plane into colleges and the no-college alternative in computed equilibrium.  The functions 
and parameters that underlie this example are discussed in Section V. 
  Another fundamental property of equilibrium is non-overlapping attendance sets for given race. 
Proposition 2.  Given r, the set of (s,y) types that attend college i and college (or no college if j = 0) is 
of measure 0.   
ji ≠
Proof of Proposition 2.  Given r, if type (s,y) attends i or j in equilibrium (i,j = 0,1,…,n; i ), then 
  If either   equals 1, then market clearance would be violated.  From (7.1), 
tuition at college i and college j then equals EMC there.  (If say j = 0, then use the convention that EMC
j ≠
ij α (0,1)andα (0,1). ∈ ∈ i α orαj
j
0 = 
0.)  Using utility maximization, it must then be that 
    (8)  ii j U(y EMC (r,s,y),q ,s) U(y EMC (r,s,y),q ,s) −= −
for these types.  If, say, utility were higher at option j than at option i, then the reservation price for 
attending college j would exceed EMCj (a contradiction to optimal pricing); or if j is the no-college option, 
none of these types would attend i.  Given qi  q ≠ j
 by Proposition 1,   implying  ij EMC (r,s,y) EMC (r,s,y), ≠
ds dy given (8) is satisfied is generically unique in the parameter space of utility functions      U(). ⋅ ,
  For given race, we refer to the loci in the (s,y) plane that partition student types into colleges and 
no college as boundary loci.  These loci are equations (8) where i and j are the best options of these types 
and students on one side choose option i and those on the other choose option j.  The panels of Figure 1 
provide an example with n = 5 (developed in detail below), where the solid lines are boundary loci.  In each 
panel, the lower left “triangle” of types do not attend college, and the diagonal slices are the attendance sets 
at progressively higher quality colleges. 
  Proposition 3 concerns tuition policies: 
Proposition 3. a. Along a boundary locus of college i,  ii p (r,s,y) EMC (r,s,y). =  
b. In the interior of college i’s attendance set (i.e., off boundary loci),  ii p (r,s,y) EMC (r,s,y). >   
c. Equilibrium student choices are the same as would result if  ii p (r,s,y) EMC (r,s,y), = i = 1,2,…,n, for all 
(r,s,y), all else constant.  That is, if student (r,s,y) chooses option i in equilibrium, then: 
  13    (9) 
j 0,1,...,n;j i
ii jj U(y EMC (),q ,s) MaxU(y EMC (),q ,s),
=≠
−⋅ ≥ − ⋅
with strict inequality in the interior of attendance sets. 
Proof of Proposition 3. a. This follows from the definition of boundary loci and the Proof of Proposition 2. 
b. Tuition pi < EMCi to a student attending college i contradicts (7.1).  Tuition pi = EMCi in the interior of 
college i’s attendance set and pj = EMCj at the best alternative j would contradict Proposition 2.  Tuition pi 
= EMCi and pj > EMCj at the best alternative j would contradict market clearance (since then α   
Tuition p
j 1). =
i = EMCi and pj < EMCj at the best alternative j is impossible, since pj < EMCj implies j is not an 
option for the student. 
c. Contradicting (9), suppose that a student attends option i, when   
for some    Since p
jj ii U(y EMC ,q ,s) U(y EMC ,q ,s) −> −





i   EMC ≥
y i n g
i by (7.1) (and by definition if i = 0),    
If j = 0, then utility maximization would be contradicted.  If j ≠  0, then 
and thus that market clearance is violated (as then     Having 
established (9), the alternative to it holding with strict inequality in the interior of an attendance set would 
have it hold with equality (at least for some values of (r,s,y)).  This would contradict Proposition 2.   
v
jj p( q; ) C, i m p l α 1 = j
  The results in Proposition 3 are quite intuitive.  On boundary loci, students are indifferent to the 
adjacent options with tuitions equal to EMC, implying higher tuition would drive away the students.  Since 
EMC declines with score and increases with income in any college, merit aid and need-based aid are 
implied along boundary loci.  Likewise, financial aid is provided to the under-represented race.  Moving 
into the interior of attendance sets, preferences change so that students would have strict preference for the 
college attended if EMC-pricing prevailed.  The attended college then increases tuition, taking away the 
consumer surplus that would otherwise result.  Reference to the panels of Figure 1 provides further 
clarification.  Consider the students who attend the lowest quality college in equilibrium, those lying 
between the bottom two lower-left boundary loci (solid curves) in each panel.  Those on the bottom 
boundary loci are indifferent to the no-college option, their best alternative to college 1, and face tuition 
equal to EMC1(Α ) at college 1.  Moving above the bottom boundary locus slightly, these students continue 
to have the no-college option as their best alternative, and college 1 sets tuition (above their EMC1) to make 
  14them indifferent to no college.  This is so until the dashed line between the bottom two boundary loci is 
reached (which is only slightly above the bottom boundary locus in Figure 1), this dashed locus equation 
(8) with i = 0 and j = 2.  Crossing this locus, students have college 2 as their best alternative with access at 
p2 = EMC2, and this option dictates tuition at college 1.  Similarly, those who attend college 2 have either 
college 1 or college 3 as their best alternative, as delineated by the dashed curve, and so on.
22 
  The price discrimination in the interior of attendance sets is not very pronounced for realistic 
parameterizations (as below), implying merit aid, need-based aid, and discounting to the under-represented 
race prevails.
23,24  Since it is in the interest of any college to attract any student willing to pay more than 
EMC, the price discrimination that is practiced will not disrupt the allocation implied by EMC-pricing (i.e., 
Proposition 3c), a variant of a standard result concerning first-degree price discrimination. 
   Proposition 4 summarizes the effects of the preference afforded to members of the under-
represented race who attend college in equilibrium. 
Proposition 4. a. Higher Utility.  Members of the under-represented race who attend college have higher 
utility than those from the other race with the same (s,y), with the exception of those from the under-
represented race with no college as their best alternative (who have the same utility as their counterparts 
from the other race). 
b. Lower Tuition.  Members of the under-represented race with the same (s,y) and in the same college as 
members of the other race pay lower tuition, with the exception of those from the under-represented race 
who have no-college option as their best alternative (who pay the same tuition as their counterparts from 
the other race). 
c. Higher College Quality.  If the shadow value of racial diversity rises along the college quality hierarchy 




Ii Γ /q )
                                                 
22 Boundary loci might meet (but cannot cross), in which case the partition is somewhat more complicated 
but tractable.  See Epple and Romano (2002) for related examples. 
23 One can derive further results about properties of pricing for particular specifications of utility, including 
the Cobb-Douglas specification adopted in our computational model below. 
24 The top college exercises “more” price discrimination since it faces competition only on the lower side of 
the quality hierarchy. 
  15Proof of Proposition 4. a. We show first that, if a student (r,s,y) attends college i in equilibrium, then 
v
ii p () p (q,) ⋅= ⋅  satisfies: 
        ( 1 0 )  
j1 , 2 , . . . , n ; ji
ii jj U(y p (),q ,s) MaxU(y EMC (),q ,s).
=≠
−⋅ = − ⋅
Since   in equilibrium, market clearance implies  i α () 0 ⋅> jj p () E MC () ⋅≤ ⋅  for all j i.  If  ≠ i p () ⋅ exceeds the 
value satisfying (10), then  v
jj p (q ; ) EMC () ⋅> ⋅  for some college j i, a contradiction (or the no college 
option is preferred to i, also a contradiction).  If p
≠
i(⋅ ) is below the value satisfying (10), then, since 
jj p () ) ⋅≤ E MC ( ⋅  for all j  i,  ≠ v
ii p () p (q;) , ⋅< ⋅  a contradiction to quality maximization by college i.  This 
establishes (10).  The result then follows since EMCj(nw,s,y) < EMCj(w,s,y) for all j  0 and 
EMC
≠
0(nw,s,y) = EMC0(w,s,y). 
b. This follows as well from the proof of part a of this proposition. 
c.  Suppose the alternative, which by Proposition 3c implies: 
          (11)  ii jj U(y EMC (r,s,y),q ,s) ( )U(y EMC (r,s,y),q ,s)forr w(nw), −≥ ≤ − =
for some (s,y) and colleges i and j having qi > qj.  To simplify notation here, let  nw
i




 denote the 
shadow value of racial diversity.  Given the first inequality in (11), 
            (12) 
ij i jj
jj
U(y EMC (w,s,y) z ,q ,s) U(y EMC (w,s,y) z ,q ,s)
U(y EMC (nw,s,y),q ,s),
−+ > − +
=−
the inequality in (12) by normality of demand for quality (see (1)) and the equality by definition (see (7.2) 
and (7.3)).  By supposition, zi – zj > 0, this with (12) implying: 
                (13)  ii i j U(y EMC (w,s,y) z ,q ,s) U(y EMC (nw,s,y),q ,s). −+ > −
Since the left-hand side of (13) equals   (again by (7.2) and (7.3)), we have a 
contradiction of the second inequality in (11), implying the result.                  , 
i U(y EMC (nw,s,y),q ,s) −
  The reason members of the under-represented race who attend college and have no college as their 
best alternative are not better off than their counterparts from the other race is that colleges price away 
surplus and utilities are the same across the races in the no-college alternative.  Proposition 4c provides a 
sufficient condition, satisfied in our computational analysis, such that gains to the under-represented race 
  16entail weakly higher quality education.  While the condition is not necessary for this result in general, 
absent it a nonwhite might choose to attend a lower-quality college than a counterpart white, utility gains 
due to a substantial tuition break.  It is important to keep in mind that the relatively more favorable 
outcomes for nonwhites we find in equilibrium depend on the “lower” distribution of (s,y) associated with 
nonwhites.  In our model, if f
w(s,y) / f
nw(s,y), then outcomes are race neutral.  While some nonwhites with 
the same (s,y) as whites are better off due to affirmative action for realistic parameter values, nonwhite 
presence in colleges will be proportionally lower than for whites, so we do not mean to imply nonwhites 
are better off as a group. 
  As in the example in Figure 1, equilibrium will frequently exhibit within race income and score 
stratification.  By income stratification, we mean that, for given race and score, whenever a potential 
student changes options as income rises, a higher-educational alternative is chosen.  Income stratification 
will result as a consequence of normality of demand for educational quality, unless preference for income 
diversity causes sufficiently rising aversion to higher-income students by colleges as one moves up the 
quality hierarchy.
25  We find that the shadow value of income diversity does rise at the top of the college 
quality hierarchy in our computational model below, but not by enough to disrupt income stratification.  
Score stratification for given race and income is defined analogously.  A sufficient condition for score 
stratification is a weakly increasing shadow value of scores along the quality hierarchy.
26  This 
characterizes the equilibrium computed below (and numerous related specifications that we have analyzed).  
Note that the combination of income and score stratification for each race produces the “diaganolized” 
partition into colleges in the panels of Figure 1. 
  We do not have a proof of existence of equilibrium.  We can show existence of an allocation that 
satisfies utility maximization, market clearance, and has all colleges at a local maximum of Problem (6).  
The difficulty in confirming that the allocation is an equilibrium is that the quality maximization problem is 
not a quasi-concave programming problem, so conditions for global optimality cannot be shown using 
standard methods.  While we cannot then be certain that we compute equilibria below, because colleges are 
                                                 
25 For the specification of utility adopted in our computational model, there is a simple condition for 
income stratification.  See footnote 30. 
26 The shadow value of score in college i is   the negative of the coefficient on s in EMCi (see (7.2) 
and (7.3)).  
θ I q/ q ,
  17at local optima (and the remaining equilibrium conditions are satisfied), the allocation is at least an 
equilibrium if we presume adjustment costs.  Suppose that colleges bear adjustment costs: 
wn w
S
K( [δ(w,s,y)f (s,y) δ(nw,s,y) f (s,y)]dsdy), + ∫∫  with   where δ  is 
any deviation from the equilibrium admission policy α . Then for K” sufficiently high, the allocation 
we compute is an “equilibrium with adjustment costs.”  For expositional ease, when we discuss the 
computed allocation below, we refer to it as just an “equilibrium.” 







IV. Theoretical Analysis with Proscription of Affirmative Action 
  We model the proscription of affirmative action practices by colleges as requiring that college 
policies are race blind.  A college’s admission and tuition policies are then restricted to be functions of (s,y) 
only.  Colleges will factor the informational content of (s,y) about race into their decision calculus in an 
effort to promote racial diversity.   
  Equilibrium is defined analogously.  Colleges continue to maximize the same quality index, 
solving the modified problem presented below.  The market clearance condition is here race blind: 
 with   continuing to denote college i’s admission policy.  Generally, 





α (s,y) 1for optimalα (s,y),
=
≤ ∑ i α () ⋅
A.  Modified College Problem and Solution.  Since the races are treated the same, the reservation price 
function is also race blind: p
v = p
v(qi;s,y).  College i now solves: 
 
nw θ ,I ,k ,µ ,Γ ,α (s,y) ii i i i i
nw nw
ii y i i Maxq(θ ,I ,µ µ ,ΓΓ )      ( 1 4 . 0 )  
s.t.         ( 1 4 . 1 )   i α (s,y) [0,1] (s,y); ∈∀
       (14.2)  v
ii
S
p( q ( ) ; s , y ) α (s,y)f(s,y)dsdy W C(k ,I ); ⋅ + ∫∫ i i ≥
        ( 1 4 . 3 )   ii
S
k α (s,y)f(s,y)dsdy; =∫∫











= ∫∫        ( 1 4 . 5 )  








      ( 1 4 . 6 )  
  The solution has the same condition (7.4) describing choice of inputs (Ii), and race-blind 
admission policy: 
       (15.1)  v
ii
1
α (s,y) [0,1] asp (q ;s,y) EMC (s,y);
0
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     (15.2) 
The race-blind EMC is analogous to that above (see (7.2) and (7.3)), except for the last term.  With and 
without affirmative action, the last term in EMC measures the cost of admitting a student type on racial 
diversity, but now using (s,y) as a signal of race.  Multiplying the term in parentheses at the end of (15.2) 
by 1/ki, one has the expected change in the diversity measure   from increasing   which is 
then multiplied by the dollar cost of maintaining quality (
nw






i k ).  Admitting types (s,y) with proportion 
of nonwhites in the population of potential students exceeding the college’s proportion of nonwhites 
( ) improves racial diversity, with then negative diversity cost.  The diversity cost is, of 
course, positive (or zero) for the remaining set of student types. 
nw nw nw
i Γ f/ f Γ >
B.  Equilibrium Properties.  The strict-quality-hierarchy property (Proposition 1) continues to characterize 
equilibrium with the same proof.  Again, attendance sets do not overlap in the (s,y) plane, here for the races 
combined.
27  As well, the properties of pricing and the allocation collected in Proposition 3 have 
                                                 
27 The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 2. 
  19straightforward race-blind counterparts, and are shown by analogous arguments.  Obviously, nothing akin 
to Proposition 4 regarding racial differences for given (s,y) holds here.  Score and income stratification are 
more easily violated here due to using (s,y) type as a signal of race, although income stratification 
continues to characterize the computations below.  The existence issue is the same.  
Predicting the effects of proscription of affirmative action on the provision of higher education, 
consumption of it by the races, and on normative measures depends on the functional and parametric 
properties of the environment.  Hence, we turn to our computational specification. 
 
V. Computational  Model 
 
To provide evidence regarding the quantitative effects of a ban on affirmative action, we employ a 
computational counterpart to our theoretical model.  We generalize and refine the computational model in 
Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2002a). We use the shorthand ERS to refer to that source in the discussion that 
follows. In calibrating the model, we seek to characterize the distributions of income and test scores by race 
for the U.S. population.  In doing so, we employ data from the U.S. Census, data purchased from Petersons 
that is a survey of the universe of colleges and universities, data from the NSF WebCASPAR system, and 
data on a sample of college students from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey of the National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). In addition, we use parameter estimates from our econometric 
analysis in Epple, Romano, and Sieg (forthcoming). The calibration is in 1995 dollars. The computational 
model has five “colleges” in addition to the non-college option.  
The model has two races, whites and nonwhites. Data for nonwhites are obtained by combining 
data for African American and Hispanic students and households. We set the proportion of nonwhite 
potential students to .20, using 2000 Census data.  The income distribution of each race is taken to be 
lognormal. In ERS, the parameters of the income distribution for each race are chosen to match mean and 
median incomes in the U.S. population. Here we modify the calibration so that average income of college 
attendees in the computed equilibrium equals the average income in the NCES data. The ratio of the mean 
incomes of nonwhites relative to whites is as in ERS and the standard deviations of the logarithms of 
income by race are from ERS. This yields ln(y) ~ N(9.92, .764) and ln(y) ~ N(9.85,.746) for whites and 
nonwhites respectively. 
  20As with the distributions of income, the race-conditioned distributions of score are for the 
populations of potential students. The distributions thus characterize the scores of college attendees as well 
as predicted scores of those who do not attend college. The parameters of the distributions of score in the 
model are chosen so that the means and variances of ln(s) conditional on college attendance in computed 
equilibrium equal the means and variances of total SAT (in thousands) for white and nonwhite colleges 
attendees in the NCES data. This yields ln(s) ~ N(.924,.190) and ln(s) ~ N(.735,.20) for whites and 
nonwhites respectively. The correlation of ln(y) and ln(s) for each race is set equal to the correlation for the 
population of students in the NCES data, yielding a correlation of .25. This completes the calibration of the 
joint distribution of income and score for the two races. 
Endowments per student were chosen to correspond to those in the NSF WebCASPAR data. 
Colleges were ranked by SAT score and combined into five groups with an equal number of students in 
each group. Endowment per student was then calculated for each group. We assume that a draw of 2% per 
year from endowment is allocated to undergraduate education.
28 This yielded endowment income per 
student of  $155, $243, $386, $755, and $4149 for the five colleges. 
The combined utility and quality function is chosen to be Cobb Douglas: 
 The parameters are thus the exponents on own 
score, inputs, mean score, income diversity, and racial diversity. We choose these parameters and the 
quality of the outside option so that the equilibrium level with affirmative action of college attendance of 
the two races combined corresponds to that observed in four-year colleges in the U.S. (estimated in ERS to 
be 28.2%) and equilibrium average cost per student approximately equals average instructional 
expenditures reported in the NSF WebCASPAR data. The parameters of the utility-quality function are also 
chosen so that equilibrium shadow prices on income, score, and race correspond roughly to magnitudes we 
obtained from Tobit regressions of financial aid on those variables using the NCES data (Epple, Romano, 
and Sieg forthcoming). Those estimates were an approximate $1,100 increase in financial aid per standard 
deviation of SAT, $30 dollar reduction in aid per $1,000 increase in family income, and financial aid to 
35 12 4 φφ φφ φ yR U( yp ) q s; qIθ (D ) (D ) ;ln(s) SAT. =− ⋅⋅ = =
                                                 
28 This is a somewhat arbitrary allocation since we do not have data with respect to the allocation of 
endowment funds across undergraduate, graduate, and research activities. 
  21nonwhites relative to whites of $1,500. The exponents on inputs, mean score, income diversity, and racial 
diversity in the quality function are .0705, .0825, .02, and .0029 respectively.
29 
The custodial cost function (V(k) + F) was chosen to be cubic. Parameters were chosen to generate 
colleges that are roughly equal in size and to yield average custodial costs that are approximately one fourth 




3+ Ik.   Cost-minimizing scale in the chosen function is k
*=.069. 
Comparison of the equilibrium when affirmative action is permitted to the data is provided in 
Table 1, with the data based on the five college groupings described earlier. Income, SAT, and racial 
composition data are from the NCES. Inputs are instructional expenditures from NSF WebCASPAR. As 
the table reveals, input expenditures and SAT scores match reasonably well between the model and the 
data. Average SAT and average percent nonwhite also match reasonably well between the model and the 
data. In the data, minorities are not under-represented in the bottom tier of colleges, while our model 
predicts under-representation in all colleges.  Average income from the model closely matches average 
income in the data, reflecting our calibration strategy, but the model predicts more income stratification 
than is present in the data. In our calibration, we did not impose a match between the model and data of the 
percent of college attendees who are nonwhite. Thus, it is encouraging to see that the equilibrium 
percentage of college attendees that are nonwhite from the model (14.6%) is only slightly below the 
average in the data (15.3%). However, as is evident from the table, the model predicts a more equal 
distribution of nonwhites across colleges than is found in the data. Overall, given the parsimony of our 
model, we view the match between the model and data as encouraging. 
 
VI. Computational Results 
 
The top panel of Table 2 provides further detail regarding the equilibrium when affirmative action 
is permitted. Nonwhites are under-represented in each college.  Note that the shadow prices on racial 
diversity ascend in the equilibrium. From part (c) of Proposition 4 it then follows that the quality of 
education for nonwhites is at least as high as for whites for given (s,y). This in turn is illustrated by a 
                                                 
29 The value of φ  is irrelevant to the equilibrium allocations, and then need not be calibrated to compute 
equilibria with and without affirmative action.  However, the value of φ is relevant to some of the 
normative analysis we pursue, and its calibration is discussed below. 
1
1
  22comparison of the boundary loci for whites and nonwhites in Figures 1 and 2. The boundary loci are 
overlaid in Figure 2 to facilitate comparison of the admission spaces. The lower boundary loci for 
nonwhites relative to whites illustrate the improved access by nonwhites to quality colleges as a result of 
affirmative action. A comparison of average SAT scores and average incomes across colleges in the upper 
panel of Table 2 provides further illustration.
30  
Table 2 also reports shadow prices (sp) for score, income, and race, i.e., the coefficients on these 
variables in EMC (recall (7.2) and (7.3)).  These shadow prices correspond closely to actual variation in 
tuition with student characteristics in colleges 1 through 4 in computed equilibrium.
31  Those colleges thus 
have little market power, with tuitions closely approximating effective marginal costs. In college 5, the 
marginal increase in tuition with income is approximately twice as large as the shadow price. The marginal 
decrease in tuition with score is approximately half the shadow price on score and the discount to 
nonwhites is approximately half the shadow price on racial diversity.  These features of pricing in college 5 
reflect the greater market power of the top college as compared to the remaining colleges, as it faces 
competition only from lower-quality colleges.  
The bottom panel of Table 2 reports the equilibrium outcomes when affirmative action is 
proscribed. This change results in a 35% drop in college attendance by nonwhites. This drop is particularly 
pronounced in the higher-ranked colleges and is accompanied by a dramatic increase in the shadow price 
on racial diversity along the quality hierarchy. In the top college, the attendance by nonwhites drops by two 
thirds. Recall that in our computational model, the top “college” represents the top tier of institutions. In the 
computed equilibrium the top college is attended by approximately 13.5% of the student population. Thus, 
a drop by two thirds in attendance of nonwhites in that set of institutions would be a very large impact. We 
should emphasize that our computational model is a Spartan representation of reality, and this should be 
kept in mind in thinking about the numerical estimates of the impact of proscribing affirmative action. 
However, the computational analysis supports the conclusion that the effects of proscribing affirmative 
                                                 
30 Income stratification results in this specification if quality multiplied by one plus the shadow value of 
income increases along the college quality hierarchy.  This condition is satisfied here. 
31 We investigated properties of tuition functions by generating a random sample of students from the 
distribution of types. We determined the school each student would attend in equilibrium and the tuition in 
that school. We then estimated linear regressions of tuition on income, score, and race for each college. All 
coefficients in these regressions were highly significant, and all the regressions have R
2 values greater than 
.99. The text summarizes findings from these regressions.  
  23action will be substantial and will be increasingly pronounced as one moves up the college quality 
hierarchy. 
Admission spaces with and without affirmative action are shown by race in Figure 3. The solid 
lines are the boundary loci when affirmative action is permitted. The dashed lines, common to both races, 
delineate admission spaces when affirmative action is proscribed. Where the loci are shifted upward by a 
ban on affirmative action, college access is more restricted and conversely where the loci have shifted 
downward. A combination of three effects on effective marginal cost of admission of type (s,y) from 
proscribing affirmative action explains the changes in the admission spaces in Figure 3.  Without 
affirmative action, (s,y) types with higher ratio of nonwhites in the population than in the college have 
lower EMC and are then relatively preferred by the college (recall the last term in parentheses in (15.2)).  
Figure 4 shows the boundary loci under the ban and introduces contours with constant ratios of nonwhites.  
Admission of relatively higher-income and higher-score types will worsen diversity, and the reverse for 
relatively lower-income and lower-score types.  As seen in Figure 3, colleges modify their admission 
policies as they accept lower-scoring types with high and moderately high income, students who are 
relatively likely to be nonwhite, leading to the hump-shaped boundary loci without affirmative action.  The 
second effect is that, relative to when affirmative action is permitted, the signal of race is weakened under 
the ban, this increasing EMC under affirmative action for nonwhites and decreasing it for whites.  
Mathematically, this corresponds to the increase in the term in parentheses in (15.2) relative to the 
counterpart term in (7.2) for nonwhites, and the reverse for whites (here comparing to (7.3)). This signal 
weakening corresponds to the loss in power to discount tuition to nonwhites and charge a premium to 
whites.  The third effect is the change in the shadow value of racial diversity, which rises in equilibrium 
under the ban in all colleges.  The three effects approximately offset at high scores for whites, which 
implies higher EMC for the same (s,y) for nonwhites due to the second effect.   For high scores, boundary 
loci are approximately the same for whites but shift out for nonwhites.  For whites, a ban on affirmative 
action improves college access particularly for those with relatively lower incomes and scores. For 
nonwhites, the shift is generally toward more restricted access except for those with relatively lower 
incomes and scores.   
  24The upward sloping segment of the boundary loci under the ban raises the issue of incentive 
compatibility since some students have the opportunity to under perform on the exam and gain access to a 
higher quality college.  The equilibrium allocation is, however, incentive compatible with respect to 
claiming a lower s than the actual value.  Here we provide an intuitive explanation with proof in an 
appendix (available on request).  In the equilibrium, we have verified that tuition declines with s in each 
college for given y.  Hence, no student who would stay in the same college with a lower score would claim 
to have such an s.  Neither would a student who would attend a higher quality college with a lower score 
underreport s.  Utility of a student reporting a lower s while staying within any college declines as we have 
discussed, and utility of a student reporting an s that places him on a boundary locus is the same in each 
college (as is easily shown).  Combining the latter facts implies incentive compatibility. 
A comparison of the two panels in Table 2 reveals a rise in average SAT scores of nonwhites in 
lower-ranked colleges and a fall in higher-ranked colleges. This is a consequence of the reduced access of 
nonwhite students to higher-ranked colleges. We also see a higher average income for nonwhites relative to 
whites in colleges.  To understand this phenomenon, first note that along the downward sloping portion of 
boundary loci (where most students fall), tuition declines as score rises, hence the minimum income level 
for admission also declines with score.  This coupled with relatively more whites having higher scores 
induces lower average incomes of whites in colleges.   
We calculate two normative measures on potential student types of the effects of proscribing 
affirmative action.  One is the standard compensating variation of the ban.  We also calculate the effect on 
educational achievement, using the interpretation of the utility function: U = U(y-p,a(q,s)).  Reasons to 
examine separately effects on achievement are as follows.  Social externalities from educational 
achievement may be present that would have no effect on compensating variation.  Role models provided 
by highly educated individuals are one potential example.  The compensating variation measure is also 
suspect because the utility function may better be interpreted as a reduced form, suitable for describing 
behavior but not for standard normative analysis.  We have required normality of demand for educational 
quality, consistent with observed behavior, but frequently interpreted as a manifestation of borrowing 
constraints.  Last, because we are studying education, effects on achievement are also intrinsically of 
interest.  While our results with respect to achievement rely on the assumption that quality affects utility via 
  25its effect on achievement, we emphasize that this assumption is not required for any of our other 
computational results.  
We first investigate the effects of affirmative action on achievement.  The achievement function 
implicit in our Cobb-Douglas specification of utility-quality is   We define normed achievement as 
proportional to own score: 
1 φ aq s. =
1 1 φ
N =
13 φ 5φ ==
aq  We have thus far not required a calibration for  since the 
equilibria are invariant to the choice of   For calculating effects on achievement, we set the elasticity of 
normed achievement with respect to peer ability equal to 20% of the elasticity of normed achievement with 
respect to own ability. Thus, 
s .




32  With this calibration of the achievement function, we 
obtain the effects of affirmative action on normed achievement that are reported in Table 3. Table 3 shows 
the within cell mean of the proportional change in normed achievement from banning affirmative action, 
the cells delineated by deciles of income and score for each race.  White students generally gain in 
achievement, particularly those with lower incomes and ability among college attendees. Nonwhites 
generally experience declines in achievement. As is evident from the table, these effects are quite large for 
some groups of students. For nonwhites, the largest effects are on those who attend college in the presence 
of affirmative action but do not attend college when affirmative action is banned. For white students, the 
largest effects are experienced by those who switch from the no-college alternative to college when 
affirmative action is banned.  
The effects on household welfare are exhibited in Table 4.
33 These are expressed as the within cell 
mean of the compensating variation from eliminating affirmative action relative to household income, the 
 
32 In defining normed achievement and calibrating the effect of peer relative to own ability, we follow 
Epple and Romano (1998).  Recent evidence provides further support for our calibration. Using data for 
college roommates who are randomly assigned, Winston and Zimmerman (forthcoming) study three 
colleges. They run separate regressions for the three colleges using cumulative GPA as the dependent 
variable, which can be interpreted as estimating our achievement function if GPA is regarded as the 
logarithm of educational achievement.  This is analogous to our calibration linking the logarithm of score to 
SAT.  They find a student's own SAT to be significant in all three colleges. They find the effect of 
roommate’s SAT score to be relatively significant as well, with significance levels of .06, .01, and .15 in 
the three colleges (Table 3).  They estimate the effect of roommate SAT relative to own SAT in the three 
colleges to be .1 .17, and .1. Our calibration is intended to capture other mechanisms for peer influence in 
addition to those studied by Winston and Zimmerman, and we therefore see our chosen value of .2 as being 
quite plausible. 
33 A concern that has been raised with respect to affirmative action is not captured by our normative 
measures.  Affirmative action may stigmatize higher-scoring nonwhite students if it leads those having 
incomplete information about students (perhaps instructors and potential employers) to infer their academic 
  26cells defined as for achievement effects. The effects on welfare also tend to be favorable for whites while 
unfavorable for nonwhites. Given the relative magnitudes of the shifts in loci exhibited in Figure 3, it is not 
surprisingly that the welfare effects for nonwhites are proportionately larger than for whites.  The per capita 
compensating variation (not as a percentage of income) is only -$8.90, with per capita amounts by race 
equal to $33.32 and -$177.82 for whites and nonwhites respectively.  The latter values are misleading 
because they include potential students who do not attend college in either equilibrium and are unaffected 
by the ban.  Conditioning on the number of students in college initially, the means by race rise to $111.81 
and -$859.03. 
34  Thus we see the distributional effects are quite large.  
Tuitions when affirmative action is permitted are displayed in Table 5. These are the within cell 
means conditional on attending college in the associated equilibrium.  Comparison of the upper and lower 
panels reveals the tuition discounts received by nonwhites when affirmative action is permitted. 
Comparisons within each panel reveal the variation of tuition with income and score. Within each panel, 
tuitions are lowest in the upper right corner. Those able, low-income students convey positive externalities 
via aptitude and via enhancement of income diversity. As a result, they receive very large tuition discounts. 
For a given income level, the tuition benefits accorded higher-aptitude students are offset to some degree 
by the propensity of higher-aptitude students to attend higher-quality, higher-tuition colleges. Thus, within 
a given row of either panel, there is less tuition variation than within a column. 
The changes in tuition associated with proscription of affirmative action are exhibited in Table 6, 
calculated for students in college in both equilibria. White students with more moderate incomes and 
abilities experience tuition decreases while those with high income or high ability experience smaller 
decreases and, in some cases, increases.  Declines in tuition to whites are largely explained by their no 
longer paying a premium for their adverse effect on diversity, and cases of increased tuition by attendance 
at a better college.  Most nonwhite students experience some tuition increases since discounts to race have 
been eliminated. The magnitude of the increase is highest for students with high income or high score and 
somewhat less for students with moderate income and ability relative to the overall student population. In 
                                                                                                                                                 
qualification from the mean score of their minority peers in a college.  We find the score differential 
between whites and nonwhites drops in the bottom four colleges under the ban, substantially in the bottom 
two colleges; but rises drastically from 134 to 289 SAT points in the top college with the ban (see Table 2).  
The implications of our findings for stigmatization are then mixed.      
34 The percentage of whites that attend college without affirmative action is 29.8 and the percentage of 
nonwhites attending is 20.7. 
  27comparing across the tables, it should be recalled that the ranges defining cell boundaries are scaled to 
correspond to deciles of the two racial groups. Overall, the magnitude of the changes experienced by 
nonwhite students is generally larger than for white students. 
Summarizing, the normative effects on nonwhites from proscription of affirmative action are 
decidedly grim.  Educational achievement declines on average in every cell of Table 3 but one, as nonwhite 
students attend lower quality colleges or are driven out of college, with large effects on the latter subset.  
Every subset of nonwhite students affected by the ban has lower welfare.  The one group of nonwhite 
students that are drawn into higher quality colleges pay higher tuition (at all alternatives) and are worse off, 
and the one group that pays lower tuition in equilibrium has this offset by lower quality education.  Whites 
that are affected significantly by either normative measure gain.  Those whites that gain substantially in 
educational achievement are those that attend college only without affirmative action, but their welfare gain 
is largely eliminated by their tuition payments. 
 
VII.  Discussion 
 
Critics of affirmative action sometimes characterize college admission policies as “quota 
systems,” that establish numerical targets for admissions solely based on race.  If colleges pursue racial 
quotas, they accept a certain fraction of minority students independently of their qualifications. Opponents 
of affirmative action have argued that such a system is seriously flawed since it rewards or penalizes 
prospective students using a one-dimensional criterion without regard for other qualifications. The 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that all people must be 
treated equally under the law.  Moreover, Title VI of the Civil Right Act of 1964 states that “no person in 
the United States shall on the grounds of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”'  Racial quotas are generally considered to be unconstitutional following the Supreme 
Court's decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. (1978). 
This raises the question of whether admission and pricing policies implied by our baseline model 
discussed in Sections II and III differ from those implied by a quota system.  We interpret a quota system as 
  28one in which administrators set bounds, denoted by Γ  such that:    In the 
limiting case  , and a college commits to admitting a certain fraction of minority students.   
nw nw
min max andΓ ,
nw nw nw
min i max ΓΓΓ . ≤≤
nw nw
min max ΓΓ =
The specification of our baseline model implies that a college that attempts to maximize quality 
would not want to adopt quotas.  This follows immediately from the observation that quotas impose 
additional constraints on colleges that limit their ability to achieve their objective of quality maximization. 
In the baseline model, colleges value diversity.  However, racial diversity is only one of four factors 
characterizing school quality.  Thus colleges are facing trade-offs when admitting minority students. In 
equilibrium, a college must balance the desire to admit minority students with the need to generate 
revenues, the desire to attract highly qualified students, and the objective to achieve socio-economic 
diversity. 
Ceteris paribus minority students have the inherent advantage over non-minority students that they 
also provide racial diversity.  From the perspective of an administrator this advantage is comparable to the 
advantage that more academically qualified students have over their less qualified peers.  Gifted students 
provide a different type of externality than minorities.  A minority student with equal academic 
qualification and income will get preferential treatment by administrators over a non-minority student with 
the same characteristics (Proposition 4). The degree of preferential treatment ultimately depends on the 
relative weight that is assigned to racial diversity in comparison to the other three quality components. 
To illustrate the distinction, consider the following comparative static exercise.  Suppose that a 
downturn in the economy reduces incomes of minorities relative to non-minorities and this further lowers 
minority educational achievement (scores) pre-college.  While this could obviously have the effect of 
further reducing minority presence in colleges in our model, the same would not result with a binding 
quota. 
The results of our computational exercises reported in Table 2 indicate that the fraction of 
minorities in equilibrium is almost constant across college types when affirmative action is allowed.  This 
equilibrium thus resembles a quota system at first sight.  However, we would like to stress that this finding 
is not an inherent feature of our model.  
Proponents of affirmative action in higher education have argued that the currently used admission 
policies are justified under the U.S. Constitution.  The main legal argument is based on an interpretation of 
  29Justice Powell's opinion regarding the Bakke ruling.  This interpretation states that “the educational benefits 
that flow from a diverse student body are sufficiently compelling to permit a school to consider race and/or 
ethnicity as one of many factors in making admissions decisions through a “properly defined” admission 
program.”
35  Proponents of affirmative action also point out that current admission policies often do not 
differ much from the “Harvard Plan,” which was directly endorsed by Justice Powell and the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the Bakke case.  They claim that selective colleges would not be able to attract a sufficient number 
of minority students if they were not allowed to use race as a criterion in admission policies. 
To illustrate the limitations of achieving diversity using race-neutral admissions, we consider the 
version of our model discussed in Section III.  An important feature of pricing and admission policies that 
describe equilibrium allocations when affirmative action is banned is given by equation (15.2).  To 
highlight the main differences between equation (15.2) and equations (7.2) and (7.3), it is insightful to 
consider the special case in which there exist values of score and income which are perfect signals of race, 
i.e., values such that    For those minority students equation (15.2) reduces to 
equation (7.2).  In general, score and income are imperfect signals of race.  Colleges that are restricted to 
use race-blind criteria adopt policies that can be called “admission and pricing on correlation.”  Students 
who’s observed characteristics imply that they are more likely to be minority students receive some 
preferential treatment in admission and financial aid decisions. 
nw w f (s,y) f (s,y) 0. >=
                                                
If admission and financial aid policies are race blind, colleges have additional incentives to gather 
background information on prospective students.  Much of the background information collected by 
colleges would be useless if colleges can use race directly.  However, family background and geographical 
information may be good signals for the race of a prospective applicant -- perhaps better than income and 
academic qualification -- and thus may convey important information to administrators.  Thus as long as 
colleges are allowed to discriminate based on observed variables which are highly correlated with race and 
not easily manipulated by a prospective student, colleges will be able to adopt admission and pricing 
policies which closely mimic those adopted in equilibrium when affirmative action is allowed. 
 
35 The citation is taken from the brief in opposition submitted by the University of Michigan in Grutter vs. 
Bollinger, p.1. 
  30Of course, it is doubtful that admission and pricing policies that condition on variables that are 
strongly correlated with race and otherwise irrelevant to educational quality would be constitutional, if 
current practices would be found unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court.  A ban on affirmative action 
is only meaningful if it imposes limits on the ability of colleges to price on correlates.  This raises some 
important questions. Undoubtedly colleges and universities want to provide need-and merit-based financial 
aid.  Moreover, the U.S. government subsidizes need- and merit-based policies using a variety of programs.  
It is hard to believe that any serious policy maker would argue that these types of programs are, in 
principle, undesirable. 
Thus pricing on academic qualification and income may be desirable even if pricing on race or 
pricing on other correlates is not.  As we have seen above, this allows administrators to pursue racial 
diversity indirectly by adopting pricing and admission policies that take the signal value of income and 
academic qualification into consideration.  Thus, our specification of the model that considers the effects of 
banning of affirmative action is a hybrid case. It assumes that administrators are still allowed to pursue 
racial diversity, but are limited to race-blind admission policies.  Our computational analysis indicates that 
if colleges can only use income and score as signals for race, they are severely limited in their ability to 
attract minority students and achieve racial diversity.   If we interpret a ban on affirmation in a strict a 
sense, then such policies may also be unconstitutional.  Of course, requiring colleges to use race-blind 
admission and financial aid policies is a lot easier to monitor and enforce than requiring them to abandon 
diversity as a quality criterion.  Nevertheless, we have also considered a version of our model in which 
colleges and students do not have any preferences for racial diversity (Epple, Romano, and Sieg, 2002a). 
This model captures the scenario that is most likely to occur if a strict ban of affirmative action is adopted 
by the Supreme Court.  The resulting admission and pricing policies are then not only race-blind, but also 
do not exhibit pricing on correlation.  Our analysis suggests that the effects of banning affirmative action 
would be even more pronounced in this scenario than those reported in Section VI of this paper.
36 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
                                                 
36 There are some important differences in the predictions of the two models. For example, the seemly 
counter-intuitive finding that the mean SAT scores of minorities declines by almost 200 points in the top 
schools is an artifact of pricing on correlates.  Such a steep decline does not occur if pricing is solely merit- 
and need-based. 
  31In this paper, we have considered the role that affirmative action and racial diversity plays in 
admission and financial aid policies of colleges.  We have presented a model that captures a number of 
important features that characterize the market of higher education in the United States.  We would like to 
emphasize that our model is a Spartan version of reality, and this should be kept in mind in thinking about 
some of the quantitative predictions derived in the computational analysis.  Nevertheless, the model allows 
us to explored how market equilibria might be affected if affirmative action programs are banned in a 
number of meaningful ways.  We have adopted a general equilibrium perspective throughout this paper 
which rests on our conjecture that the effects of banning affirmative action will not be small or negligible. 
Ultimately, our analysis is positive in nature and focuses on simple comparative static exercises. 
Independently of what one thinks about the desirability of racial diversity and affirmative action, our 
analysis clearly documents that a ban of affirmative action and the resulting adoption of race-blind 
admission policies will likely have a substantial impact on the racial composition of colleges, the 
achievement of minority students, and the distribution of gains resulting from higher education in the 
population.  The composition of the most selective colleges in the country and the types of minority 
students that are currently attending these colleges and the bottom tier of colleges are likely to be most 
affected by such a ban.      
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